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ABSTRACT
Cronyism is the substitution of political influence for free markets. It comes about 
when government has a lot of power over private-sector decisions and when the gov-
ernment officials in power have great discretion over how to use it. Cronyism is not 
simply a zero-sum game that takes from some and gives to others; it is negative-sum. 
The losses to the losers substantially outweigh the gains to the winners. In short, cro-
nyism destroys wealth. By shifting power to government, cronyism makes political 
power more important and increases the competition for that  political power. The 
way to reduce or end cronyism is to reduce or end that government power.
JEL code: N4
5“When you leave the honey jar open, expect ants.”
—anonymous
When I speak of the benefits of economic freedom and free markets, many people in my audiences do not think of those terms the way I think of them. In the question-and-answer sessions that follow my 
talks, it seems people often think they are taking issue with free markets when they 
are actually rejecting cronyism—a term that encompasses government favoritism, 
special privileges, and special interests.
For example, people will object to the Wall Street bailouts carried out by the 
Bush and Obama administrations. As do I, because those bailouts violate free-mar-
ket principles. They will object to government regulation that makes it difficult for 
small food producers to produce and sell food not inspected and approved by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture. As do I.
As we shall see, cronyism has been around for a long time and is a bipartisan prob-
lem that has thrived under Democratic and Republican presidents and congresses. 
Cronyism not only picks winners based on political connections rather than on the 
extent to which they serve consumers, but also is destructive of wealth, sometimes 
highly so.
This is not a comprehensive overview of cronyism. No short study could be. 
Rather, it provides a perspective of cronyism: what it is, what’s wrong with it, some 
examples of it, why it happens, and how to reduce it.
WHAT IS CRONYISM? 
What is the difference between free markets and cronyism? In free markets, buy-
ers and sellers are free to agree on price; no government agency restricts who can 
buy or sell, and no one is told how or what to produce.1 In contrast, under cronyism 
the government rigs the market for the benefit of government officials’ cronies. This 
1. Of course, there are degrees of freedom. Markets in the United States are generally freer than those 
in Venezuela. But markets in Hong Kong are generally freer than those in the United States. Within 
the United States, the book market is much freer than the health care market.
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takes various forms. Governments sometimes grant monopolies to one firm or limit 
the number of firms that can compete. For example, most U.S. municipalities allow 
only one cable company to operate in their area even though there is no technologi-
cal reason more could not exist. The same is true for most other utilities.
Governments sometimes use quotas or tariffs to limit imports with the goal of 
protecting the wealth and jobs of domestic producers who compete with those 
imports. President George W. Bush did this in 2002, for example, when he imposed 
tariffs ranging from 8 to 30 percent on some types of imported steel.2 Governments 
sometimes subsidize favored producers, as the Obama administration did with the 
politically connected solar-energy firm Solyndra. Governments may use antitrust 
laws to prevent companies from cutting prices so that other, less-efficient compa-
nies can prosper: For example, beginning in 1958, the U.S. government prevented 
Safeway from cutting prices for a quarter of a century.3
The entities governments help with special regulations or subsidies are not 
always businesses; sometimes they are unions. The federal government’s National 
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) complained against Boeing in April 2011, for exam-
ple. In response to a complaint from the International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers (IAM), the NLRB sought to require Boeing to produce its 787 
Dreamliner in Washington State rather than in Boeing’s chosen location of South 
Carolina. According to the NLRB, by saying that “it would remove or had removed 
work from the [Puget Sound and Portland] Unit because employees had struck” 
and by threatening that “the Unit would lose additional work in the event of future 
strikes,”4 Boeing was making “coercive” statements to its employees. As a matter of 
fact, it was not. Boeing was simply telling the employees some likely consequences 
of the union’s actions. 
The Boeing-IAM case is not as simple as most of the press implied. It turns out 
there was a prior case of cronyism. The government of South Carolina promised 
Boeing “$900 million in tax relief and other incentives” in exchange for moving 
production to South Carolina.5 Such is the tangled world of cronyism.
WHAT’S WRONG WITH CRONYISM?
Good law should treat people in similar situations similarly. By definition crony-
ism treats people in similar situations differently. This particular individual gets a 
subsidy because of his connection to politicians; that one does not. This particular 
industry gets subsidies or government protection from competition because it is 
particularly effective at organizing politically; that industry, whose members are 
2. “Bush Imposes Steel Tariffs,” USA Today, March 5, 2002.
3. John B. Kirkwood, Antitrust Law and Economics (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2004), 
315.
4. NLRB, Case 19-CA-32431, April 20, 2011.
5. Carl Horowitz, “NLRB Sues Boeing; Seeks End to Commercial Jet Production in South Carolina,” 
National Legal and Policy Center, May 4, 2011.
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more into product innovation and less into lobbying, does not. In short, cronyism 
plays favorites.
One’s first thought might be that cronyism is simply a forced redistribution 
from some to others and is, therefore, zero-sum. But this is false. Cronyism is 
 negative-sum. That is, in the process of redistributing wealth, cronyism destroys 
wealth. Sometimes it destroys large amounts of wealth in the process of giving rela-
tively small amounts of wealth to chosen parties. This is distinct from free mar-
kets. In every free-market transaction, both buyer and seller gain or they would not 
engage in the transaction.6
How does cronyism destroy wealth? Consider a hypothetical tariff on chew-
ing gum. Such a tariff imposes costs on U.S. gum chewers that are larger than the 
benefits it confers on U.S. gum makers. Imagine that a U.S. gum maker’s cost of 
producing a pack of gum is $0.90 and the gum maker sells the gum for $1. The gum 
maker earns $0.10 profit per pack of gum. Now imagine that a producer in another 
country produces a pack of gum for only $0.70. This gum producer tacks on a profit 
margin of, say, $0.07 and sells the gum in the United States for $0.77. At that price, 
the domestic gum maker cannot make money and is about to go out of business. The 
domestic gum maker lobbies the U.S. government and persuades officials that the 
foreign gum maker is engaging in “unfair competition.” The U.S. government slaps a 
$0.23-per-pack tariff on gum imports. As a result, the price of the foreign producers’ 
gum in the United States increases to $1. 
Consider the gains and losses. At $1, the U.S. gum producer gains $0.10 per pack. 
The gain to U.S. residents producing gum from this tariff is $0.10 per pack, but the 
loss to U.S. gum buyers is not $0.10 per pack. Gum buyers are prevented from buying 
imports at $0.77 and must now pay $1. Their loss is $0.23 per pack. The net loss in 
wealth to the U.S. economy is $0.13 per pack:7 the U.S. seller’s gain of $0.10 per pack 
minus the U.S. buyers’ loss of $0.23 cents per pack.8
Cronyism also destroys wealth by shifting the allocation of resources away from 
what consumers want and toward what governments with discretionary power 
want. Put aside for these purposes the issue of externalities, in which costs are 
imposed (negative externalities) or benefits are conferred (positive externalities) on 
people who have no market relationship with those doing the imposing or confer-
ring. Consider instead a simple case of a company producing a product consumers 
are buying. If consumers decide to buy less of that product, the decrease in demand 
will cause the highest-cost firms to go out of business or at least to shrink. As a 
result, resources would leave that use and go to where consumers value them more. 
6. The big exception to this principle is when one side or the other is misinformed, either because of 
fraud or because of inadequate information.
7. Actually, the net loss is somewhat higher. There is a deadweight loss from the exchanges that do not 
happen: the sales not made to buyers who valued the gum at amounts greater than $0.77 and less 
than $1.
8. This ignores the loss that consumers bear from not being able to buy the additional gum they would 
have purchased at the lower price of $0.77. My estimate of net loss, therefore, is an underestimate. 
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Now imagine that the government wants to “save jobs” and shore up profitability 
in the otherwise shrinking industry. It can do that by subsidizing the firms so they 
do not have to go out of business or shrink as much as they would have. Such subsi-
dies are a typical example of cronyism.
By keeping resources in that use—in which consumers have clearly indicated 
their declining interest—the government prevents them from going to other uses 
consumers prefer. This is inefficient. It causes companies to produce more things 
the government wants and fewer things consumers want. The government thus 
distorts the economy.
Imagine what would have happened if the government had tried to preserve 
firms producing horse-drawn buggies after the introduction of the automobile 
caused the demand for buggies to fall. Resources—labor, capital, and raw materi-
als—would have been kept in that industry and away from other industries. Such 
buggy subsidies would have kept the auto industry smaller. 
Yet another way to see the destruction of wealth caused by cronyism is to note 
that government officials who direct resources have neither the right incentives nor 
adequate information to make good decisions. The incentive part is fairly obvious: 
Government officials are spending other people’s money, and no one is as careful 
with other people’s money as with his own. The information part is more subtle and 
draws on an insight from a famous 1945 article by Friedrich A. Hayek.9 In the article, 
which helped Hayek later win the Nobel Prize in economics, Hayek notes that the 
information a central planner would need to plan an economy well is information 
the planner cannot have because the relevant information exists in dispersed form 
in the minds of millions of people. That insight applies also to the government offi-
cial trying to make investments of taxpayers’ money. That official cannot have the 
information he needs to make good investments. As Lawrence Summers, Obama’s 
former economic adviser, wrote in a 2009 e-mail about Solyndra, “The government 
is a crappy [venture capitalist].”10
Cronyism also destroys wealth by causing companies to use resources to influence 
government decision makers. These resources create benefits for the companies that 
spend them, or the companies would not do it. But they represent a loss to the econ-
omy. The term economists use to describe this investment in getting government 
favors is rent seeking. The term is misleading: It is really privilege-seeking.11
9. Friedrich A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35, no. 4 
(September 1945): 519–30, available online at http://www.econlib.org/library/Essays/hykKnw1 
.html.
10. Eric Lipton and Matthew L. Wald, “E-Mails Reveal Early White House Worries over Solyndra,” 
New York Times, October 3, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/04/us/politics/e-mails-reveal 
-white-house-concerns-over-solyndra.html.
11. See David R. Henderson, “Rent Seeking,” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, ed. David R. 
Henderson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008), available online at http://www.econlib.org/library/
Enc/RentSeeking.html.
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If a company spends $10 million on lobbying for tariffs or subsidies, it is invest-
ing in reducing wealth. Although the gain in wealth to the firm is likely to exceed 
$10 million, the $10 million expenditure represents a loss to society. In 2009 the 
total amount of lobbying expenditures reported by registered federal lobbyists was 
$3.47 billion.12 This is less than 0.03 percent of U.S. gross domestic product that year. 
The main costs of cronyism are not in the resources used in rent-seeking but in the 
distortions they create.
Cronyism creates privilege. We often hear that someone is privileged because he 
is wealthy or that someone else is underprivileged because he is poor. That was not 
the original meaning of the word. Hayek writes:
It would indeed be privilege if, for example, as has sometimes been 
the case in the past, landed property were reserved to members of 
the nobility. And it is privilege if, as is true in our time, the right to 
produce or sell particular things is reserved to particular people 
designated by authority.13 
Hayek notes that the term “privileged” had come to apply to anyone who owned 
property, even though virtually every adult’s right to own property has become 
widely accepted. We see something similar today. Those who have a great deal 
of wealth are called privileged even if they earned their wealth without using any 
political pull. Those who are poor, on the other hand, are called underprivileged, 
even if their poverty has nothing to do with having less than the average amount of 
privilege. 
Nevertheless, cronyism, by creating privilege, transfers wealth from the many 
to the favored few. If cronyism takes the form of subsidies, the transfers are from 
taxpayers in general to the few privileged people or companies. If cronyism takes 
the form of tariffs, the transfers are from the many consumers to the favored few. 
Cronyism also promotes corruption by creating a questionable relationship 
between businesses and government officials such that what you get depends on 
whom you know.
RECENT CRONYISM
On November 21, 2008, word leaked that president-elect Barack Obama had chosen 
Timothy Geithner as his treasury secretary. At the time, the U.S. Treasury, under the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), had a great deal of discretion over which 
firms to bail out and at what prices. Discretion in bailing out firms is the essence of 
12. “Federal Lobbying Expenditures Climb in 2009 as Lawmakers Execute Aggressive Congressional 
Agenda,” OpenSecrets.org, February 12, 2010, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/02/federal-
lobbying-soars-in-2009.html.
13. Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944), 89.
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cronyism. In a December 2010 study, MIT economist Daron Acemoglu and four 
colleagues pointed out:
TARP explicitly granted broad powers to the Treasury to intervene 
in the financial sector, and [then treasury secretary Henry] Paulson 
had used it to pressure nine major banks into accepting $125 bil-
lion of new government capital on one day. TARP was especially 
significant because it gave the Treasury Department a direct role 
in determining which banks succeeded or failed.14
Acemoglu et al. found that in the 10 days following the November 21 leak, financial 
firms that had a preexisting connection with Geithner had “a cumulative abnormal 
return” of about 15 percent. Translation: the value of the stock of these Geithner-
connected firms rose 15 percent after people learned that Geithner was named 
Treasury Secretary. Clearly, the market expected firms connected to Geithner to 
do better, all other things equal. Acemoglu et al. also consider—and reject, based on 
the evidence—alternative explanations for these abnormal stock returns. 
Acemoglu et al. note that 15 percent is substantially higher than had been found 
in past studies of other powerful federal decision makers. For example, Columbia 
University economist Raymond Fisman, along with David Fisman, Julia Galef, and 
Rakesh Khurana, tried and failed to find similar results for firms with connections 
to Vice President Dick Cheney. They concluded, “Contrary to conventional wis-
dom, we find that in all cases the value of ties to Cheney is precisely estimated as 
zero.”15 Presumably the reason is that Cheney had far less discretionary power than 
Geithner.
The Bush administration exhibited numerous instances of cronyism, particularly 
in its last year. Perhaps the most egregious of these instances occurred during the 
fall 2008 bailout of the insurance giant AIG, which received over $100 billion in U.S. 
government funds. The bailouts were engineered under the discretionary authority 
of then treasury secretary Henry Paulson, who prior to that appointment made a 
considerable fortune largely as a long-term employee of Goldman Sachs. If it is true, 
as seemed likely, that without this bailout AIG would have gone bankrupt, then it 
would not have been able to pay all its debts, and in fact, Goldman Sachs was the 
biggest single recipient of the bailout funds AIG paid. Goldman Sachs received $12.9 
14. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak, and Todd Mitton, “The Value of 
Political Connections in the United States” (working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, MA, December 2010), http://www.hbs.edu/units/finance/pdf/Value%20of%20
Political%20Connections%20Dec%207%202010%20v2.pdf.
15. David Fisman, Ray Fisman, Julia Galef, and Rakesh Khurana, “Estimating the Value of Connections 
to Vice-President Cheney” (working paper, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, 2006), http:// 
fairmodel.econ.yale.edu/ec483/ffgk.pdf. 
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billion.16 Paulson had sold his shares of Goldman Sachs upon becoming treasury sec-
retary, so he did not gain directly from the indirect largesse the federal government 
bestowed upon Goldman Sachs.17 Still, through the AIG bailout, Paulson restored or 
preserved the wealth of many of the high-level managers of Goldman Sachs, many 
of whom were former colleagues of Paulson. That is cronyism.
Another example of cronyism is the Obama administration’s huge subsidy to 
Solyndra that became a news-worthy scandal in 2011. One reason people noticed 
is that the federal government’s highly touted $535 million investment in Solyndra 
went sour. Another reason for the scandal is that e-mails between various officials 
in the Obama administration show their desperation to shovel hundreds of millions 
of dollars into this politically privileged company. The Washington Post reports: 
[Steve] Spinner came from Silicon Valley to serve as a senior adviser 
[to the Energy Department] on the loan program, and his wife was 
a lawyer with Wilson Sonsini, the law firm representing Solyndra 
in its application. Despite an ethics agreement under which he said 
he would recuse himself from Solyndra’s loan application, corre-
spondence shows that Spinner defended the company, worked to 
get the president or vice president to visit its factory, and pushed 
for a final decision on approving the company’s loan.
       “How [expletive] hard is this?” Spinner wrote to a career staffer 
on Aug. 28, 2009, asking for answers about final approval from 
an OMB [Office of Management and Budget] official. “What is he 
waiting for? Will we have it by the end of the day?”18
Of course, a much larger instance of cronyism under the Obama administra-
tion, one that makes the Solyndra case tiny by comparison, is the bailout of General 
Motors (GM) and Chrysler. Bush and Obama together diverted $77 billion in TARP 
funds to GM and Chrysler. In organizing their bailouts and bankruptcies, Obama 
violated the rights of Chrysler’s creditors and gave a sweetheart deal to the United 
Auto Workers union. Law professor Todd Zywicki explains:
In the years leading up to the economic crisis, Chrysler had been 
unable to acquire routine financing and so had been forced to turn 
16. Michael Mandel, “German and French Banks Got $36 Billion from AIG Bailout,” Bloomberg 
Businessweek “Econochat,” March 15, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/the_thread/eco 
nomicsunbound/archives/2009/03/german_and_fren.html.
17. Rebecca Christie and Matthew Benjamin, “Paulson Risks Goldman Standard as Fannie, Freddie 
Shares Erode,” Bloomberg, August 21, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarch
ive&refer=home&sid=a8w9MI4Btco4.
18. Joe Stephens and Carol D. Leonnig, “Solyndra Loan Deal: Warning about Legality Came from with-
in Obama Administration,” Washington Post, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/solyndra-obama-and-rahm-emanuel-pushed-to-spotlight-energy-company/2011/10/07/gIQA-
CDqSTL_story.html.
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to so-called secured debt in order to fund its operations. Secured 
debt takes first priority in payment; it is also typically preserved 
during bankruptcy under what is referred to as the “absolute prior-
ity” rule— since the lender of secured debt offers a loan to a trou-
bled borrower only because he is guaranteed first repayment when 
the loan is up. In the Chrysler case, however, creditors who held 
the company’s secured bonds were steamrolled into accepting 29 
cents on the dollar for their loans. Meanwhile, the underfunded 
pension plans of the United Auto Workers—unsecured creditors, 
but possessed of better political connections—received more than 
40 cents on the dollar.19
 
Moreover, in a typical bankruptcy case in which a secured creditor is not paid 
in full, he is entitled to a “deficiency claim”—the terms of which keep the bank-
rupt company liable for a portion of the unpaid debt. In both the Chrysler and GM 
bankruptcies, however, no deficiency claims were awarded to the creditors. Were 
bankruptcy experts to comb through American history, they would be hard-pressed 
to identify any bankruptcy case with similar terms.20
Why did the Chrysler bondholders not object? Many did. But, Zywicki notes, the 
federal government (in this case, the U.S. treasury secretary) had enormous power 
over financial institutions through TARP, and these institutions owned much of 
Chrysler’s secured debt. This also helps explain why Geithner-connected firms’ 
stocks increased in value so much when his appointment became known. 
Although examples of cronyism are prevalent under the Obama administration, 
cronyism did not begin there. For example, what gave Timothy Geithner such great 
power was TARP. Obama was responsible for TARP only to the extent that one 
senator’s vote matters, because TARP passed when he was a junior senator, before 
he became president.
THE BUSH BAILOUTS 
Many forget that the Obama administration did not initiate the bailout. George 
W. Bush, in one of his last major actions as president, handed Obama the blank 
check called TARP. Despite a vote by the U.S. Senate against bailing out auto compa-
nies,21  the Bush administration used TARP money to do just that.22 It is true that the 
19. Todd Zywicki, “The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law,” National Affairs, no. 7 (Spring 2011),  
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-auto-bailout-and-the-rule-of-law.
20. Ibid.
21. David M. Herszenhorn and David E. Sanger, “Senate Abandons Automaker Bailout Bid,” New 
York Times, December 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/12/business/12auto 
.html?pagewanted=all. 
22. David E. Sanger, David M. Herszenhorn, and Bill Vlasic, “Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices 
Await Obama,” New York Times, December 19, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20 
/business/20auto.html?pagewanted=all. 
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law creating TARP two months earlier had given significant discretionary power 
to the U.S. treasury secretary. But this power was to help financial institutions, not 
auto companies. That is why the U.S. Senate voted on an auto bailout. The senators 
recognized that an auto bailout required special legislation. But Bush flouted their 
will and, in the process, broke the law.
This was not the first time Bush had made decisions based on cronyism. In March 
2002, he imposed tariffs on steel. He specifically singled out tin-mill steel for special 
treatment, imposing a tariff of 30 percent. Domestic tin-mill steel was produced by 
Weirton Steel, “one of the biggest employers in West Virginia.”23 Bush narrowly 
won West Virginia’s electoral votes, partly by promising to give the steel industry 
special treatment. Note the irony. The Bush administration purposely used govern-
ment power to drive up the price of steel, which raised auto manufacturers’ costs, 
and then used further government power to help auto manufacturers.
Most instances of cronyism are facilitated not only by government power in gen-
eral, but also by government’s discretionary power. When government officials have 
a lot of leeway in the decisions they can make about which companies and unions to 
help and which to harm, cronyism is at its ugliest. 
OTHER INSTANCES OF CRONYISM 
It is not difficult to find many examples of cronyism in the 20th-century United 
States. One famous example not reported until decades after it occurred is the case 
of young Texas congressman whose wife became the nominal owner of a business 
that he used his political power to help her obtain.
Here’s what happened. Between December 1939 and January 1943, despite 
countless attempts, the owners of Austin, Texas, radio station KTBC were unable to 
get permission from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to sell the sta-
tion. But on January 3, 1943, the wife of a Texas congressman filed her application 
to buy the station and 24 days later, after waiting more than three years, the owners 
were allowed to sell. The congressman’s wife paid $17,500 for the radio station. In 
June 1943, she applied for permission to operate 24 hours a day, up from daylight 
hours only, and at a much better part of the AM frequency. The FCC granted per-
mission one month later. While all this was happening, the FCC was under attack 
by another powerful congressman, Eugene Cox of Georgia. The aforementioned 
Texas congressman strategized secretly with FCC official Red James and used his 
influence with Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn to deflect the attack. In fact, 
James later admitted that he had recommended to the congressman’s wife that she 
apply for the license. In 1943, the congressman and his wife had a net worth of 
approximately zero. But by 1964, when this congressman was elected president 
23. “Bush Imposes Steel Tariffs,” USA Today, March 5, 2002, http://www.usatoday.com/money 
/general/2002/03/05/bush-steel.htm. 
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of the United States, Lyndon Baines Johnson and his wife’s net worth was at least 
$14 million. The radio station’s value accounted for about half of this $14 million.24
Some of the most egregious examples of cronyism in U.S. history involve defense 
contractors. There’s a reason for this. The cases of cronyism I have discussed so far 
involved private companies generally producing goods they sell to other private 
companies or individuals. That’s true of solar panels, cars, and steel. The private 
market constrains cronyism because there is a market test. Ultimately, the goods 
will be sold to people or entities spending their own money, which produces a 
strong incentive to take care in purchasing. 
In contrast, defense contractors sell products almost exclusively to government 
buyers, who have much less incentive to spend money carefully. After all, they are 
spending other people’s money. Therefore the waste can be much greater.
The insidious connection between defense contractors and the military so con-
cerned President Dwight Eisenhower that he highlighted his concern in his farewell 
address.25 In that speech, he coined the famous term “military industrial complex.” 
Admirals in the Navy and generals in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps often 
push to get aircraft carriers, tanks, fighter jets, and helicopters, for example, even if 
they do not anticipate a likely mission for which these would be needed. 
One might think the U.S. Congress would act as a check on the military, but it 
probably makes things worse. Members of Congress are notorious for pushing for 
a particular weapons system or airplane engine even when Department of Defense 
officials have made it clear they do not want these things. In the 1990s, for example, 
Dianne Feinstein, a U.S. senator from California, pushed for the B-2 stealth bomber 
even though the Defense Department did not want to spend further money on the 
program. Senator Feinstein made an interesting slip in defending the program that 
gave away her true motive: “The bomber,” she declared, “can deliver a large payroll, 
precision or carpet.” In the Congressional Record the next day, her remarks were 
amended to read “payload.”26
In a more recent case, Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) pushed for 
funding for an alternate engine for the F-35 joint strike fighter, even though Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates claimed the extra engine “would be a waste of nearly $3 bil-
lion.”27 General Electric, which, with Rolls Royce Group, is the engine’s producer, 
had “about 1,000 employees working on the engine in a facility near Cincinnati” at 
24. This story is told masterfully and in great detail in Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: 
Means of Ascent (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1990), 82–111.
25. Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” speech, 1961, in Public Papers of the Presidents 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Various), 1035–40, http://www.h-net.org/~hst306 
/documents/indust.html.
26. Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2005), 258.
27. Roxana Tiron, “U.S. House Votes to Kill GE Engine for F-35 Fighter,” Bloomberg, February 16, 2011, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-16/u-s-house-votes-to-kill-f-35-backup-engine-from 
-ge-rolls-with-funds-cut.html.
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the time.28 In this case, the nearly $3 billion has not yet been wasted because the 
House of Representatives voted to kill the funding. 
IS BUSINESS BAD?
Many people look at the sorry record of cronyism and conclude that big business 
is bad. But this does not follow. Some big businesses do not engage in cronyism at 
all. In the recent bailout, General Motors did but fellow auto giant Ford Motor Co. 
did not. (Ford Motor Co. did its share in the past, however, lobbying for restrictions 
on auto imports in the early 1980s.29 ) Some small businesses do engage in cronyism. 
Solyndra, for example, is not a large firm. Size is not what matters. 
Is business bad? No. Under the right rules—enforcement of contracts, open entry, 
no special favors, and so forth—business is good. A business is a voluntary asso-
ciation of people who put resources together to produce something other people 
value. In other words, businesses create value. Whether it is Apple producing the 
iPhone and iPad or the locally owned 7-11 store making sure milk is available for 
customers at 10:30 p.m., businesses are trying to make money and have found, as 
Adam Smith noted in The Wealth of Nations,30 that the surest way to do this is to 
provide goods and services people are willing to buy. Not only are businesses in 
general not problematic, there are also cases in U.S. history in which businesses 
and businessmen have been maligned unjustly, leading to increased government 
power over the economy. One prime example involves the so-called trusts of the 
19th century and the infamous robber barons. There are two problems with this 
term: The so-called robber barons were neither robbers nor barons. That they were 
neither robbers nor barons is most clearly exemplified by so-called robber baron 
Cornelius Vanderbilt. Vanderbilt started building his fortune by competing with 
a legal monopoly on steamship travel granted by the New York state government. 
When he was 23, Vanderbilt became the business manager for a ferry entrepreneur 
named Thomas Gibbons. Gibbons’s goal was to compete with Aaron Ogden, who ran 
a ferry between New Jersey and New York. Gibbons and Vanderbilt achieved this 
goal by charging low fares, thus benefiting passengers. Vanderbilt and Gibbons were 
breaking the law because Ogden had a legal monopoly on that route. In the case 
Gibbons v. Ogden, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the New York state government 
could not legally grant a monopoly on interstate commerce.31
The Vanderbilt case was not unusual. If the trusts of the late 19th century had 
28. Ibid.
29. See, for example, “Ford Chairman Urges Auto Import Restrictions,” Toledo Blade, October 9, 1980, 
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=4klPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=IQMEAAAAIBAJ&pg=7087%
2C4753935. 
30. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 1994 [1776]), 
Book I, Chapter 2.
31. This fascinating story is told in Burton W. Folsom Jr., The Myth of the Robber Barons, 6th ed. 
(Herndon, VA: Young America’s Foundation, 2010), 2–4.
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monopolized the industries in which they operated, as most people believe, those 
trusts should have kept output low and prices high. In some path-breaking research 
in the 1980s, however, Loyola University economist Thomas DiLorenzo found the 
opposite. In a 1985 article, DiLorenzo found that between 1880 and 1890, while real 
gross domestic product rose by 24 percent, real output in the allegedly monopolized 
industries for which data were available rose by 175 percent, seven times the econ-
omy’s growth rate. Meanwhile, prices in these industries were falling. Although 
the consumer price index fell by 7 percent in that decade, the price of steel fell by 
53 percent, refined sugar by 22 percent, lead by 12 percent, and zinc by 20 percent. 
The only price that fell less than 7 percent in the allegedly monopolized industries 
was that of coal, which stayed constant.32 In his 1987 book A Theory of Efficient 
Cooperation and Competition, University of Chicago economist Lester Telser rein-
forced DiLorenzo’s theme, pointing out that between 1880 and 1890 the output of 
petroleum products rose by 393 percent and the price fell by 61 percent.33 Telser 
writes: “The oil trust did not charge high prices because it had 90 percent of the 
market. It got 90 percent of the refined oil market by charging low prices.”34
Unfortunately, because the myth of the robber barons became so widely believed, 
one of the damaging pieces of legislation we have inherited from the late 19th cen-
tury was the Sherman Antitrust Act. This Act and subsequent laws have been used 
by many firms to hobble their successful competitors. As Northwestern University 
law professor Fred S. McChesney put it:
One of the most worrisome statistics in antitrust is that for every 
case brought by government, private plaintiffs bring ten. The 
majority of cases are filed to hinder, not help, competition.35
In this way, the antitrust laws have contributed to the rise of cronyism.
ECONOMIC POWER IS NOT POLITICAL POWER 
There is a difference in kind between economic power and political power. 
Economic power is based on wealth, but the wealthiest person in the world cannot, 
simply by being wealthy, force me to do anything. Even the largest, wealthiest cor-
porations must pay attention to their customers. Any one customer, unless he buys 
a large percentage of a firm’s product, has little control over a large  corporation. 
32. Thomas DiLorenzo, “The Origins of Antitrust: An Interest-Group Perspective,” International 
Review of Law and Economics 5, no. 1 (1985): 73–90.
33. Lester Telser, A Theory of Efficient Cooperation and Competition (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987).
34. Ibid. 41.
35. See Fred McChesney, “Antitrust,” in David R. Henderson, ed., The Concise Encyclopedia of 
Economics, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Antitrust.html.
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But when a large number of customers react negatively to a particular firm’s prod-
uct, the firm has a strong incentive to adjust and better cater to its customers. The 
mighty Coca-Cola Corporation, for example, faced such stiff consumer resistance 
when it launched “New Coke” in the 1980s that it quickly dropped the product and 
resumed producing the original Coca-Cola.36 Gap faced resistance for changing its 
logo; the resistance was so strong that Gap returned to its old logo.37 In addition, eco-
nomic power tends to be fleeting. Peter Senge finds that the average life of an indi-
vidual Fortune 500 company is only 30 years.38 Only 71 of the original 1955 Fortune 
500 companies are still on the list,39 and in the 10 years from 1999 to 2009, almost 
half of the companies in the Fortune 500 were replaced.40 
Political power, by contrast, is the power to coerce. Lowly bureaucrats in federal, 
state, and local governments have the power to coerce me. A city official in Pacific 
Grove, California, for example, can credibly threaten me with jail time if I cut down 
a tree on my own property without permission. But Home Depot and Costco, two 
large retail establishments where I might buy the saw to cut down my tree, cannot 
force me to do or prevent me from doing anything.
Governments sometimes use their power of eminent domain to seize private 
property and sell it at a low price to large developers. This is what the city govern-
ment of New London, Connecticut, did in the infamous Kelo v. City of New London 
case.41 The government seized Susette Kelo’s land, despite her desire to stay in her 
house, in order to lure Pfizer to build a large facility and not have the facility be “sur-
rounded by tenements,” as one Pfizer employee told a reporter.42 The crucial ingre-
dient here is government. No matter how strong Pfizer’s desire to possess the land 
upon which Kelo’s house sat, without the government’s power of eminent domain, 
Pfizer could not have acted on this desire.43 
36. See “New Coke,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Coke. I thank an anonymous ref-
eree for this suggestion.
37. Nate Jones, “Haters Gonna Win: Gap Returns to Old Logo,” Time NewsFeed, October 12, 2010, 
http://newsfeed.time.com/2010/10/12/haters-gonna-win-gap-returns-to-old-logo.
38. Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization (New York: 
Doubleday, 2006 [1990]).
39. Jim Collins, “The Secret of Enduring Greatness,” Fortune, May 2008.
40. Toby Elwin, “The Cost of Culture, a 50% Turnover of the Fortune 500,” Toby Elwin blog, http://
www.tobyelwin.com/the-cost-of-culture-a-50-turnover-of-the-fortune-500. 
41. See “Kelo v. City of New London,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kelo_v._City_of_New_
London. 
42. Jeff Benedict, “Taken in Vain: New London’s Folly,” Hartford Courant, November 15, 2009, http://
articles.courant.com/2009-11-15/news/hc-commentarybenedict1115.artnov15_1_urban-fort-trum-
bull-neighborhood-barren-weed-fields-pfizer-wanted-next-door.
43. After building its large research and development facility on the cleared land, Pfizer announced its 
plans to shut down the facility. See ibid. 
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IS ALL BUSINESS LOBBYING BAD? 
One conclusion a reader might be tempted to reach at this point is that all lob-
bying of government by business is bad. But this is false. We need to distinguish 
between two kinds of lobbying. One is lobbying to persuade government officials to 
implement a special privilege, a special regulation, a special subsidy or tax break. An 
example is Solyndra’s lobbying for a government loan. The other kind of lobbying 
is lobbying to reduce government’s power, whether over the firm or industry that 
lobbies or, more rarely, government’s power in general. An example would be a 
corporation that pushes for a cut in the corporate tax rate. Another example would 
be a corporation that lobbies against heavier government regulation of medical care. 
Microsoft represents an example of lobbying to reduce government power. 
Before the federal antitrust suit of 1997, Microsoft, which had almost no lobbying 
presence in Washington, D.C., learned the hard way that it had only two U.S. sena-
tors on its side, both from Washington State.44 As a result, Microsoft substantially 
increased its lobbying presence in Washington, D.C. OpenSecrets.org writes the 
following about Microsoft:
Microsoft Corp. is the world’s top computer software company. It 
is also one of the biggest campaign contributors in Washington—an 
astounding fact when you consider that Microsoft is a relatively 
new player on the political scene. Prior to 1998, the company and 
its employees gave virtually nothing in terms of political contri-
butions. But when the Justice Department launched an antitrust 
investigation into the company’s marketing of its popular Windows 
software, things changed. The company opened a Washington lob-
bying office, founded a political action committee and soon became 
one of the most generous political givers in the country. The move 
eventually galvanized an entire industry, as computer and Internet 
companies quickly moved to emulate Microsoft’s political savvy. 
Between 2000 and 2010, Microsoft spent at least $6 million each 
year on federal lobbying efforts.45
Lobbying against government power, if successful, tends to protect the rule of 
law and property rights and tends to limit government subsidies, regulations, and 
taxes. For that reason, I think of it as usually good.46 In contrast, lobbying for special 
privilege is generally bad. 
44. For a fairly comprehensive history of the antitrust case against Microsoft, see Ken Auletta, World 
War 3.0: Microsoft and Its Enemies (New York: Random House, 2001).
45. “Heavy Hitters: Microsoft Corp.,” OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.
php?id=D000000115&cycle=2012. 
46. I say “usually” rather than “always” because lobbyists against government power might also lobby 
against government’s attempts to internalize externalities such as pollution.
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Unfortunately, lobbies that start out simply trying to protect themselves from 
intrusions by the federal government often morph into all-purpose lobbies that also 
try to hamper their competitors and seek other special privileges. As pundit Michael 
Kinsley, a former Microsoft employee, points out, “Microsoft . . . piled on, bringing 
charges against Google at the European Union, accusing it of a variety of nefarious 
practices, including some the EU had formerly accused Microsoft of.”47
HOW TO END CRONYISM
There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and 
that is to reduce government power. To reduce cronyism, we must abolish regula-
tions and cut or abolish special government subsidies. That way, there is nothing 
to fight about. For example, the government should not bail out companies or give 
special subsidies and low-interest loans to companies like Solyndra that use tech-
nologies or produce products that the government favors. It should have unilateral 
free trade rather than tariffs, import quotas, and other restrictions on imports. 
Why is the liquor lobby fairly unimportant in federal politics but very impor-
tant in Albany, Sacramento, and other state capitals? The reason is that the bulk of 
liquor regulation is at the state level, and there is relatively little regulation at the 
federal level. Regulation creates cronyism. Columnist Dan Walters, whom many 
Californians think of as the dean of California political reporting, made a related 
point in a 1988 column: “It’s no accident that the largest contributors of legisla-
tive campaign funds are from the liquor, horse racing, medical, insurance and other 
regulated industries.”48
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek, discussing the almost total government control 
Nazi, fascist, and communist governments had over their economies, writes: “As the 
coercive power of the state will alone decide who is to have what, the only power 
worth having will be a share in the exercise of this directing power.”49
Fortunately, the United States is not close to a situation where the government 
has total power over the economy, but the principle still applies. The more power 
the government has over the economy, the more allocation of resources will depend 
on political connections. The way to eliminate cronyism is to have free markets and 
little government control.
47. See Michael Kinsley, “The Washington Lobbying Dance,” Los Angeles Times, April 5, 2011, http://
articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/05/opinion/la-oe-kinsley-column-microsoft-20110405. 
48. Dan Walters, “Regulation Can Hurt Public,” February 2, 1988. I am indebted to Dan Walters for 
sending me a copy of this article. It is not available online.
49. Hayek, Road to Serfdom, 119.
